as heritage sites. Jackson relies primarily on oral history accounts and public testimony to understand why some plantations and the communities they created are significant for the identities of today’s descendants, but others are not.

Jackson’s book remains an essential source for scholars of African American cultural history and contemporary heritage management, as well as for undergraduate courses or graduate seminars on those topics. The foreword by Paul Shackel (University of Maryland professor of archaeology) and the author’s preface are useful. Jackson introduces herself as a research anthropologist of African descent at the University of South Florida, an active participant in the Gullah/Geechee Corridor Commission, and a former member of the National Park Service—all key roles in her analysis. The book has seven chapters, four of which analyze specific plantations on the US National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). All these cases illustrate contemporary heritage tourism destinations and activities focused on former slave plantations in “The Gullah/Geechee Cultural Heritage Corridor” along the Atlantic coasts of North and South Carolina, Georgia, and north Florida. The opening chapter discusses basic concepts: heritage, tradition, identity, and memory. Chapter 2 addresses of cultural heritage, tourism, management, and preservation. Chapter 7, following the four above-mentioned chapters on NRHP sites, is a conclusion. The book is well-illustrated with black and white photographs and maps. A substantial bibliography and valuable index round its laudable scholarly contributions.

Managers of slave plantation heritage sites could give descendants of a plantation’s African ancestry workers a voice about their past, and what it means to them and their communities today. By doing so, Jackson argues, managers would help African ancestry descendants publicize a much different perspective than the perspectives of local, regional, and state historical societies, or families descended from plantation- and slave-owners. On the one hand, formal designations of heritage plantation sites focus on the plantations’ roles in economic stimulation (regional or national) and promoting the social/political influence of plantation owners. African ancestry descendants, on the other hand, emphasize the many skills of their ancestors and the diversity of knowledge among them. Members of dominant social and political-economic classes tend to view people of African descent as having had little to contribute to society other than labor. So, plantation heritage site interpretations, including interpretations of identity issues today, become more complex when it is documented and celebrated that traditional knowledge or skills from Africa and lessons learned in the Americas were essential to the success of Southern plantations, especially those growing rice in the coastal wetlands.

The federal government has established four Criteria for Evaluation of NARP nominations. Criterion B requires that the property must be associated with the life of a significant person or the lives of significant persons in our past. For example, Friendfield Plantation, still a prosperous South Carolina estate in the late-1800s, officially became a NRHP heritage site due to its owners’ economic prominence in the state’s and the South’s history. Nominators did not consider including a significant person from the plantation’s African ancestry work force in the nomination. Then, in October 2008, the heritage site became world famous when it was shown to be the ancestral home of Michelle Obama’s direct ancestors. Now, the preservation and interpretation of the Friendfield Plantation slave cabins of Michelle Obama’s great-grandparents have become more important to tourists, historians, and American society than the slave-owners’ big house.

Overlooking the contributions of plantation laborers—first, as slaves, then as “free” but oppressed workers—is a persistent form of racial bias in history and social science. Correcting this bias, Jackson argues, reveals critical human issues for scholars to analyze, and the results of fresh analyses will reshape heritage site interpretation and preservation.

---


ELIZABETH EKLUND
Division of Sociocultural Anthropology, School of Anthropology, University of Arizona,
E-mail: felisbieti@email.arizona.edu
DOI: 10.1111/traa.12138.

Water management policy has typically advanced based on “sound science” principles and “urgent”
socioeconomic concerns without pausing to consider the philosophy of water or precisely what requires management. British geographer Jeremy Schmidt traces the history of that water philosophy, defined by the creation and management of “normal water.” For him, normal water “refers to the program of bringing water’s social and evolutionary possibilities into the service of liberal forms of life” (p. 6)—an idea that hinges on treating water as a resource. Yet, normal water is more than a theory, he argues; “[i]t names a set of judgements that were used to stop the search for further justification of one picture of the world” (p. 206).

This underpinning philosophy defines a resource, water, which can be objectively managed, free of the definition’s cultural origin. The philosophy then shapes understandings of how the resource should be managed. Covering over a hundred years in the history of water management philosophy, Schmidt articulates shifting views of normal water as abundant, then scarce due to its unequal distribution, and finally as a resource that must be made secure and sustainable.

Before “science [and] technology,” water was “entirely Other,” and “unmanageable” (p. 26), Schmidt notes, tracing those views through Greek, Abrahamic, and Vedic beliefs and texts. Contrasting with them is the high modernism of massive water projects recently studied by scholars from several disciplines, including James Scott, Erik Swyngedouw, Bruno Latour, and Jaime Linton. Ideas from philosophers Francis Bacon, René Descartes, and Immanuel Kant, reworked by emerging earth sciences, led to the nineteenth-century narrative of “normal water.” This shift, from unmanageable to manageable, Schmidt describes as a shift from laissez-faire metaphysics (unmanageable water) to liberal positivism (social institutions reflecting the natural world). The narrative was shaped, in part, by explorer, geologist, and federal government administrator John Wesley Powell (1834–1902), and geologist-ethnologist William John McGee (1853–1912). Ties among hydrology, geology, and uniformitarian metaphysics lead both Powell and McGee to link humans to geology through water in a way that naturalized the US Constitution and the concept of “the People.” When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “New Deal” programs led to formation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) during the Great Depression a few decades later, Schmidt argues, many government officials and citizens touted water management projects as acts of democracy.

Under public utility lawyer David Lilienthal’s chairmanship in the 1940s, the TVA “modernized” by shifting its philosophy from abundant to scarce water, and its target beneficiaries from communities to individuals. Moreover, Schmidt contends, dam building created uneven water supplies, thereby facilitating reinterpretation of abundant water as “scarce.” During the 1950s, the TVA model was incorporated into the international development agenda and exported to Africa, Asia, and Latin America, spreading a philosophy of normal water, whose logic was both supply side and colonial.

Geographer Gilbert White (1911–2006) factored economic demand into this supply-side logic of “scarce” water. Although White was not as overtly philosophical as some predecessors or contemporaries, Schmidt maintains, White’s work reflected deeply held judgements. He viewed integrated water management of Vietnam’s Mekong River Basin as a pathway to peace and a potential alternative to mid-1960s US Vietnam War policies. His recommendations led to President Lyndon Johnson’s Water for Peace Initiative in 1965 (p. 125) and to the International Hydrological Decade (IHD), 1965–1974. The IHD formed the basis for the United Nations Conference on Water and the Mar de Plata Action Plan—development initiatives emphasizing water scarcity (Nace 1969).

Scarce water, Schmidt observes, “is relieved of the requirement that it function as a rational premise” (p.142). As normal water ideas went global in the 1980s and 1990s, the philosophy of water shifted again to security and sustainability. Following the Brundtland Commission’s establishment in 1983 and The Hague Ministerial Declaration of 2000, ensuring water security gained traction. Discussing these developments, Schmidt focuses on a compound concept: the water-energy-food-climate nexus. By 1983, the then decades-old TVA began calling attention to “energy starved” developing nations, a position that Schmidt associates with ecologist Crawford “Buzz” Holling’s work on resilience and emerging ideas about sustainable water management.

There have always been competing water philosophies, Schmidt shows, referring for instance to work by noted environmentalist Aldo Leopold (1887–1948), especially his influential essay, “A Land Ethic” (1949). Nevertheless, the idea of water as a resource requiring management is now unquestioned, even hegemonic, in national and international development literatures. Scholars, activists, and policymakers seeking technical
“fixes” for water problems will benefit from Schmidt’s comprehensive and detailed treatment of the water management philosophy’s historical trajectory. Fortunately, avoiding a heavy-handed style, Schmidt makes philosophical questions accessible to current and aspiring water managers. His discussion will also resonate with social scientists and humanists drawn to the question of how philosophies are naturalized. Finally, Water would work well for upper division undergraduates or graduate students in courses about science and technology, neocolonialism and development, or resource management.

REFERENCES CITED


KATHLEEN G. WILLIAMSON
Law Office of Williamson & Young, P.C. & Visiting Scholar, School of Anthropology, University of Arizona.
E-mail: Williamson@williamsonandyoung.com
DOI: 10.1111/traa.12139.

University of Lausanne professor of cultural and social anthropology Mark Goodale’s previous scholarly writings establish a solid background for this book, rightly subtitled “a critical introduction.” Two monographs (Goodale 2008; 2009) come to mind, but he has also edited numerous volumes on anthropology, human rights, legal pluralism, justice, Latin American politics and society, and research methodology. Anthropology and Law meticulously examines two intellectual disciplines (and professions) that deal with legal and judicial processes in contemporary societies and cultures. Comprehensiveness and detail make the book a valuable contribution to legal anthropology—all the more so because it is reasonably priced in the usually high-priced textbook market. Wonderfully written, the book unfolds more like a holistic and in-depth story told by a well-briefed narrator than the typical textbook’s fractured assemblage of essays by various contributors, loosely sewn together by an editor’s introduction.

Goodale focuses on the intersection of anthropology and law as an expanding field of study and practice during the Post-Cold War period. In a world increasingly integrated by globalization, he notes, new authorities and identities have been established or old ones have been reasserted. Accompanying these developments, he adds, are concerns about the rise of transnationalism and the increasing significance of international law, with attempts to create new, enforceable legal systems based on human rights. Yet, Goodale contextualizes the Post-Cold War period by presenting a historical overview of legal anthropology, beginning with its philosophical moorings (especially in Immanuel Kant’s work) and considering treatises by proto-anthropologists of law, such as English lawyer Sir Henry Maine and American lawyer Lewis Henry Morgan, before continuing the discussion to the present. He shows why Bronislaw Malinowski and his students, Ian Hoebel and Max Gluckman, were important figures, then discusses work by contemporary legal anthropologists, among them Sally Falk Moore, Laura Nader, Lawrence Rosen, and Bill Mauer. This historical overview, enhanced by Sally Engle Merry’s brilliant foreword, serves as a touchstone for Goodale’s arguments and conclusions. More important, it provides inspiration for anthropologists, who, seeking to practice their craft outside the narrow confines of its traditional androcentrism, confront today’s conflicting human rights laws, new technologies that fall far short of universal accessibility, and environmental depletion.

The book’s cover is a purple and yellow/orange detail of an abstract painting. Is it a statement about the amorphous nature of culture, law, and/or anthropology? One realistic image would not do the topic justice, but perhaps a collage of recognizable images could convey the many occasions where law and anthropology intersect.

Goodale meets a fascinating challenge by narrating, analyzing, and illustrating what he calls the “new” legal anthropology, a flourishing and ubiquitous field of study that came of age during a liminal period after the Cold War. Real-world